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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether the partner’s social insurance coverage affects spousal 
labor supply. Using a reform which increased the sickness insurance coverage for non-
government workers, the spousal elasticity of sick days with respect to the partner’s 
benefit is estimated to 0.4. Additional analysis indicates that the partner’s insurance 
coverage is partly affecting spousal labor supply through an insurance effect and the 
overall effect is particularly large among low income families. Joint leisure is not found 
to have an effect on the overall effect. We conclude that spouses pool their supply of la-
bor. Thus if policy evaluations ignore spousal interactions they will underestimate the 
effect. 
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1  Introduction 
All OECD countries (apart from South Korea) have some form of insurance which 
compensates workers for loss of wages caused by temporary non-work related illness. 
In most European countries this system is universal and often referred to as sickness in-
surance or temporary disability insurance (TDI). The total payment of benefits is often 
substantial and constitutes more than 1 percent of GDP in many countries (OECD, So-
cial Expenditure Data Base).
1 Despite the economic significance of TDI programs, only 
a handful of studies have focused on the relationship between the insurance coverage 
and labor supply.
2 As regards spill-over effects within couples, there has been no study 
on how spousal labor supply is affected by the partner’s TDI.
3
In this article we assess if a higher benefit level in the TDI spills over to spousal la-
bor supply, by exploiting a change in the Swedish TDI system in December, 1987. This 
reform increased the benefit level for workers in the private and the local government 
sector. At the same time, central government workers were unaffected. Using data on a 
representative longitudinal sample of 3.3 percent of the Swedish population where spo-
uses in the government sector are matched with complete individual sickness history for 
the period 1986 to 1990, we estimate the causal spill-over effect with a difference-in-
differences estimator (DD). Treatment is defined on the basis of whether the partner to a 
spouse is a non-government worker or not. In contrast to most other DD-studies, we do 
not rely on a control group consisting of individuals from other sectors or regions, since 
both treated and control are spouses working in the government sector.    
 
Results show that a higher benefit level for the partner did not affect a spouse’s prob-
ability to start a new sick spell, but prolonged ongoing spells with on average 4 percent. 
                                                 
1 In addition there are five US States, including California, which have a TDI system. For more information about 
TDI,  see  the information provided by  the Social Security Administration in  the US (http://www.ssa.gov/pol-
icy/docs/progdesc/sspus/tempdib.pdf), and Kerns (1997). 
2 A higher benefit level is generally found to decrease individual labor supply through increased sick reporting 
(Johansson and Palme 1996, 2002, 2005, Henrekson and Persson 2004, Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie 
2008). 
3 There is a related literature dealing with early retirement decisions within the family. See for example, Baker 
(2002), Hesselius (2004), Kapur and Rogowski (2007), and Gustman and  Steinmeier (2004). Moreover,  worker 
absence and productivity are found to depend on the productivity and absence level of peers at work (see e.g., 
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For local government workers, where the size of the change in benefit is known, the 
spousal elasticity of sick days with respect to the partner’s benefit is estimated to 0.4. 
This can be compared to labor supply estimates from other social insurance programs 
such as the Unemployment insurance and the Workers’ compensations, where own la-
bor supply elasticities range between 0.5 to 1 (Krueger and Meyer 2002). Furthermore, 
Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie (2008) find a large direct effect on the total 
number of sick days for the same reform that we are examining in this paper. Back-on-
the-envelope calculations suggest that our estimated spill-over effect adds at least 
another 2 percent to the total reform effect and as much as 18 percent of the total reform 
effect stems from spill-over effects. So, by ignoring spill-over effects, an evaluation of 
labor supply effects among married workers from changed insurance coverage will un-
derestimate the total effect on individual behavior. 
There are various theoretical explanations why the insurance coverage for the partner 
indirectly affects spousal labor supply.
4 First, for couples with a common household 
budget, an increase in the partner’s benefit level reduces the cost of future unexpected 
events such as increased sickness absence by the partner. This insurance effect would 
unambiguously increase spousal sick reporting, regardless of whether or not the partner 
reacts to the reform.
5
In the presence of direct effects on the partner’s sick reporting behavior, there are 
additional reasons why spousal sick reporting might change. If spouses are substitutes in 
household production, spousal absenteeism can decrease if the partner carries out more 
 Second, the partner’s benefit level might also affect household in-
come and change spousal sick reporting through an income effect. Even if absenteeism 
is a normal good, the income effect with less than full compensation is, however, a pri-
ori unknown because the increased benefit level could be offset by a reduced income 
through the partner’s reduced labor supply (an income effect can also occur if the part-
ner receives lower future wages due to an increased sick reporting). 
                                                                                                                                               
Bandiera et al. 2005, 2007, Mas and Moretti 2009 and Hesselius et al. 2009). To study social interaction between 
spouses compared to between co-workers has the advantage that couples more clearly define the peers of interest. 
4 We will use the terms labor supply and sick reporting interchangeably in this paper. 
5 This is related to the added-worker effect in the unemployment insurance literature where the incentive for the 
spouse to increase labor supply when the partner becomes unemployed diminishes with the partner’s unemployment 
benefit level (Ashenfelter 1980, Heckman and MaCurdy 1980, and Lundberg 1988). Cullen and Gruber (2000) find 
that the labor supply of wives to unemployed husbands is affected by the husbands’ unemployment insurance. IFAU – Insured by the partner?  5 
household work when staying home. On the other hand, if couples have a demand for 
joint leisure, an increased benefit level for one of them might enhance such behavior. 
Taking care of the partner who is ill and fairness (i.e. if one partner stays home from 
work, then the other also wants to stay home) are other, but perhaps less obvious, ex-
planations belonging to this joint leisure hypothesis.  
To empirically disentangle these types of work disincentives effects has been proven 
difficult (Autor and Duggan 2007). For example, eliminating an income effect by con-
trolling for the partner’s income relies on a heroic assumption since the partner’s in-
come is affected by the reform itself. It is tempting to eliminate the joint-leisure hypo-
thesis by estimating the spill-over effect on a sub-sample of couples who never had any 
overlapping sick cases to check if the spill-over effect is still present. Once again, this 
would rely on a sample potentially selected based on the outcome variable. However, 
the problem is likely to be of a second order since almost all sick cases for the spouse – 
91 percent – never overlapped with the partners’. With this discussion in mind we try to 
separate out an insurance effect from the total spill-over effect. Explicitly stating the as-
sumptions required for this to have a causal interpretation, we tentatively conclude that 
at least a part of the estimated spill-over effect consists of an insurance effect.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the reform and 
in Section 3 we describe the data. In Section 4 graphical results are presented and the 
identification strategy is discussed. Results are presented in Section 5. Finally we con-
clude in Section 6.  
2  The reform 
The basic idea with a TDI is to compensate for the economic loss at times of non-
worked related temporary sickness or disability. As of today, Sweden has a compulsory 
publicly administered TDI program and it is funded primarily through a payroll tax le-
vied on employers. It covers all workers whose employers pay the payroll tax. The em-
ployer pays sick pay (80 percent of previous earnings up to a ceiling) from day 2 to day 
14. From the 15th day of sickness the insurance scheme provides sickness benefits. For 
the majority of workers, collective agreements top-up the replacement rate from the 
public system. Thus, to compute the potential benefit replacement rate of an individual 6  IFAU – Insured by the partner? 
worker one must take into account both the TDI benefits and the paid sick leave from 
the collective agreements. A physician’s certificate is required from the eighth  day 
which, in practice, gives the worker full discretion of claiming benefits the first seven 
days. The reform we will use in this paper is from December 1, 1987. Therefore we will 
describe more in detail how the insurance system worked before and after that date. 
The aim of the 1987 reform was to increase the benefit replacement rate to 90 per-
cent up to a given income cap for spells lasting less than a week (see, e.g., Proposition 
1986/87:69 and Ds S 1986:8).
6
To understand how the reform affected the benefit levels for different categories of 
workers we need to elaborate on the Swedish labor market. At that time, the workers 
where basically employed in three different sectors: workers employed by the central 
government (16 percent), workers employed by the local governments (39 percent), and 
workers employed in the private sector (45 percent). All workers except for central gov-
ernment workers were affected by the reform. For workers in the private sector we are 
unable to compute the exact replacement rate change due to the lack of information 
about their job characteristics and their collective agreements.
 The reason for the change was that some type of work-
ers only received a relatively small fraction of their previous income if they were only 
sick for a short period. This fact was considered to be unfair by policymakers (SOU 
1981:22 and SOU 1983:48) and in December 18, 1986, the government decided to inc-
rease the replacement rate for short-term disability. In addition, the one-day-waiting pe-
riod was abolished. The new TDI law came into force December 1, 1987.    
7
                                                 
6 The changes occurred during the first week of a sick case so the difference in total compensation before and after 
the reform is decreasing for each day that a spell exceeds the 7th day. To phrase it more “economically”  – 
asymptotically the reform did not change the compensation for a sickness spell (but perhaps luckily, as Angrist and 
Pischke (2009) points out, “real life does not play out in asymptotia”; Angrist and Pischke 2009, p.209). 
  Central government 
workers were not affected by the reform since the central government took advantage of 
the Social Security Act (1962:381) which made it possible for an employer (the central 
government in this case) to provide paid sick leave to its workers while at the same time 
the TDI benefits that the workers were entitled to were paid out to the employer instead. 
7 Due to the pre-reform rules of TDI, the replacement rate for a blue-collar worker in the private sector could depend 
on a number of factors such as whether she worked part time or full time, whether she had irregular working hours, 
whether she was a shift worker etc. (see the government report Ds S 1986:8). White-collar workers in the private 
sector received benefits from the public system but they were also entitled to paid-sick leave from their employers as 
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As a result, the cash sickness benefits for central governments workers were 92 percent 
of current earnings both before and after the reform. In addition, the cash benefits were 
paid from the very first day of temporary sickness so in contrast to the TDI program 
there was no waiting period for central government workers. 
Local government workers also received TDI benefits from the public system but in 
addition they received paid sick leave from their employers as a result of collective 
agreements between the unions and the employer’s federations. Consequently, the cal-
culation of the effective replacement rate must take into account both sick leave pay and 
TDI benefits. Before the reform, the effective wage replacement rate was 90 percent 
from the first day of temporary disability since the local government workers received 
paid sick leave from their employers in addition to the TDI. After the reform the local 
government workers received full wage replacement (100 percent) from the first day 
due to the change in the TDI system together with a simultaneous change in collective 
agreements. Thus, the percentage change in the replacement rate for local government 
workers was 11 percent. 
Everyone in the working population in Sweden received a letter from the Swedish 
Social Insurance Agency (previously known as the National Insurance Board) a couple 
of months before December 1, 1987, which provided detailed information about the re-
form. The letter also stated that all workers were required to provide information about 
their number of working days per year in order for them to get the benefits. The reform 
was also extensively covered in the media: both by the public television and by all the 
newspaper. Consequently, the reform was very well-known and, therefore, we should 
expect noticeable labor supply effects. 
3  Data description 
Information on sickness absence is  collected from the Swedish National Insurance 
Board and covers start and end dates for all spells in Sweden for the period 1986-1990. 
The sickness data are matched with information from LINDA, a comprehensive and 
                                                                                                                                               
a result of collective agreements between the unions and the employers. Unfortunately, we are unable to compute a 
replacement rate for white-collar workers in the private sector due to the complexity of collective agreements. 8  IFAU – Insured by the partner? 
representative data set covering 3.3 percent of the Swedish population.
8 LINDA con-
tains information on a sampled person’s household members and the marital status of 
each of them. We define two persons to be a married couple if both are reported as mar-
ried and registered in the same household. We limit the study to married persons em-
ployed by the central government aged 20–64 with a yearly income above SEK 6000.
9
Summary statistics for the total sample are presented in Panel A of 
 
Information whether the spouse is a wife or a husband, lives in an urban area and the 
age is also gathered from LINDA. Treated are defined as spouses married to  non-
governmental workers (directly affected by the reform) and spouses married to govern-
mental workers (not affected the reform) are used as controls. The sample consists of 
89,773 married persons, who in total have 167,714 sick spells. 
Table 1. Panel B 
provides summary statistics for individuals with positive spells.
10
                                                 
8 See Edin and Fredriksson (2000) for a general description of LINDA. 
 On both panels the 
sample compositions between the groups are similar except that wives tend to more 
common in the control group. No evidence is found for any relative change in group 
composition over time between the groups; this holds for both the individual sample and 
the sample with positive spells. Further, the sickness incidence seems not to have been 
affected by the reform, while the duration seems to have been affected. Spouses to part-
ners who received a higher benefit level increased their average duration with 0.36 days. 
Importantly, we cannot find any evidence that the relative increase in average duration 
in the treatment group is a result of a compositional effect rather than a reaction to the 
reform.  
9 Workers with less than SEK 6000 cannot claim benefits from the TDI. 
10 Sick spells are right-censored at 50 days. The reason is that spells with long duration amount to a very small part of 
the entire distribution with only 2.4 percent lasting more than 50 days. The relative generosity of the Swedish TDI 
during the late 1980's makes some long spells appear more like cases for the disability insurance rather than for the 
temporarily disability insurance (the longest case that started during our analyzed period lasted 992 days). When 
calculating group-time averages, these long durations add up to a large share of the total number of compensated 
sickness days, even though they only represent a very small part of the total distribution of sickness cases.   IFAU – Insured by the partner?  9 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics: Average values for treatment and control group before 
and after the reform 
 
Individual Sample 
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Individuals  40,483  28,604  12,008  8,678   
           
 
Positive Spells 














































































Spells  75,731   50,650  24,519  16,814   
Notes:  Columns (1)–(4) report standard deviations in parentheses. For the  DD-estimates,  OLS standard errors 
clustered on individuals are displayed in parentheses. 
4  Graphical analysis and identification strategy 
The goal of this paper is to identify whether the insurance coverage in the social insur-
ance system triggers indirect effects. In order to do so, we compare sick reporting for 10  IFAU – Insured by the partner? 
central government workers who are married with partners who received an increased 
benefit level with those government workers whose partner did not receive an increase 
after the 1987 reform. Sick reporting can only take non-negative values and can there-
fore be analyzed in two ways. First, one can estimate the reform effect on the probabil-
ity that a spousal sick spell occurs. Second, given that a spousal sick spell has occurred 
we might be interested in the reform effect on the duration of such a sick spell. It is 
straightforward to estimate the probability that a sick spell occurs provided that spouses 
married to governmental workers constitutes a valid control group. Estimating the effect 
on duration is problematic, however, if there is a reform effect on the occurrence of a 
sick spell. The reason is that spouses who start a sick spell due to the reform are poten-
tially selected and might have a differential sick reporting behavior over time than the 
control for other reasons than the reform. Analyzing the indirect reform effect on dura-
tion is only possible if the reform has no effect on the incidence of spousal sick report-
ing. We therefore begin the analysis by estimating the change in probability that a sick-
ness spell exceeds a given length between the treated and control group, before and after 
the reform,  based on the following linear probability difference-in-differences (DD) 
model: 
 
  P(Yigt ≥ s) =α + λt + πDgt + δs(Dgt·Postt) + uigt  (1) 
 
where Yigt is a binary variable taking the value 1 if individual i belonging to group g 
(g=1 if treated) at time t has a sick spell of s days or longer (s=1, 2, …, 100). Time ef-
fects are represented by λt (t is here defined as half-years), Dgt is a dummy variable tak-
ing the value 1 if the individual is married to a non-governmental worker (treated) and 0 
otherwise, and Postt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 from December 1987. The 
variable of interest is the interaction between the treatment dummy variable and the 
post-reform dummy, where δs measures the average reform effect on the probability that 
sick spells are at least s days on average. Note that this DD estimate is obtained for each 
length of a sick spell.
11    
                                                 
11 This is the same as to estimate the change in 1-CDF. IFAU – Insured by the partner?  11 
Figure 1 shows all estimates for durations between 1 to 100 days combined. The figure 
reveals two important insights. The first insight is that the reform had no impact on the 
incidence, that is, the probability to start a new sick spell did not change in the treatment 
group relative the comparison group as a reaction to the reform. This is seen at length 
equal one where the DD estimate is not statistically different from zero. The second in-
sight is that the reform affected the duration of ongoing spells up to around 40 days, 
where a clear pattern is seen; the effect is decreasing in magnitude from day three and 
vanishes at around the 40
th day. This suggests that the effect of the partner’s benefit 
level diminishes with the length of the spouse’s sick cases. 
Why do we observe an effect for the duration and not for the incidence? An explana-
tion could be that the employee might perceive starting a new sick spell as a worse sig-
nal to the employer compared to continue an ongoing spell with an additional day, im-
plying less promotion and career opportunities. This is the case if it is more costly for 
the employer to adjust work plans and find a substitute for a new sick case than for a 
person who has already been on sick leave for a while.  



























Note: The figure shows the change in probability that a sickness spell exceeds a given length (on the x-axis) between 
the treated and control group before and after the reform. Standard errors are clustered on a time-group level. 
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On the basis of the above results we explore the effect on duration more in detail. The 
half year development of average length for sick cases in the treatment and the control 
group are shown in Figure 2, measured in logarithmic form. During 1986 and 1987, the 
two years before the reform, central government workers married to other central gov-
ernment workers (the control group) had on average longer spell lengths than central 
government workers married to non-central government workers (the treatment group). 
Even if average durations are different between the groups, the trends are very similar 
up until 1987 which supports the parallel trend assumption.
12
Figure 2. Average log duration: Comparing treatment and control group for the period 
1986-1990 
  Furthermore,  average 
duration is relatively low the first half year while for the second half it is relatively high, 
revealing a seasonal pattern. In the years 1988 to 1990 the seasonal pattern is sustained 
but now with a big difference: the treatment group, that before the reform had an on av-
erage shorter spell length, now have a longer spell length than the control group. This 
shift is striking and indicates that an increased insurance coverage affects spousal labor 















                                                 
12 Another issue, discussed by Athey and Imbens (2006), is that the DD-approach can be sensitive to the functional 
form assumption when treated end controls have different outcome levels prior to the reform. Unless the time trend is 
zero for the two groups, the parallel trend assumption can never hold for both levels and logs. Since there seems to be 
no trends for treated and controls we also examine the development of average duration in levels for the treatment 
and control group. The results are robust to this change.   IFAU – Insured by the partner?  13 
The next question is whether the graphical results hold if we apply a statistical analysis 
to test whether the effect is significant. Using individual cross-sectional data for the pe-
riod 1986-1990, the following linear difference-in-differences (DD) model can be for-
mulated:  
 
  Yigt = α + lt + βXit + πDgt + δ(Dgt·Postt) + εigt   (2) 
 
where Yigt is sick duration for individual i belonging to group g (g=1 if treated) at time t. 
The vector Xit includes individual characteristics (family size, age and two binary va-
riables indicating if the spouse is a wife and whether living in an urban area). Although 
summary statistics in Table 1 did not indicate any compositional changes over time for 
the groups, these variables are still included in order to control for any observed 
changes in compositions between the two groups, and in order to improve precision of 
the reform effect. Once again, the variable of interest is the interaction between the 
treatment dummy variable and the post reform dummy where δ measures the average 
reform effect on spousal duration.  
One main concern when estimating the effect with a regression model are intra-class 
correlation  potentially leading to false inference. When individuals within certain 
groups are correlated, OLS standard errors might be grossly understated if the regressor 
of interest varies only at the group level (Moulton 1986). This means that OLS standard 
errors from equation (2) are downward biased if observations within treatment-time are 
correlated. To solve this problem we model correlation within group-time by assuming 
that the error term also consists of a group-time error, such that εigt= υigt + ηgt, where ηgt 
is a random error component specific to group g in time t (both errors are assumed to be 
homoscedastic and ηgt are uncorrelated across group-years). Using clustered standard er-
rors is not appropriate in this case since that would require a large number of group-
times. Instead, we apply the two-step approach suggested by Donald and Lang (2007). 
In the first step we construct covariate adjusted group-year effects by estimating: 
 
  Yigt = mgt + bXit + υigt   (3) 
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where mgt = lt + αDgt + δ(Dgt·Postt) + ηgt. The estimated group-time effects, m ˆ gt, are 
group-time means of the outcome adjusted for individual variables. In the second step, 
we regress these estimated group-time effects on all variables that vary at the group and 
time levels using the following equation:  
 
  m ˆ gt = α + lt +  πDgt + d(Dgt·Postt) + ugt  (4) 
 
where ugt = ηgt + (m ˆ gt–mgt). Since this equation is formulated at the group-time level, 
correlated errors within group-years are taken into account. As pointed out by Donald 
and Lang (2007), homoscedasticity of ugt is a natural assumption when the number of 
observations in each group is large, which is true in our case. This point demonstrates 
that in many circumstances, the most efficient estimator is the unweighted OLS esti-
mator. When estimating the treatment effect we difference equation (4) across spouses 
married to government and non-government workers, respectively, and run OLS on the 
following equation:  
 
  Δm ˆ t = π + dPostt + Δut  (5) 
 
where Δm ˆ t =  m ˆ 1t –m ˆ 0t (Δut is analogously defined and assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed). This estimation is based on T time observations and is equiva-
lent to a group fixed-effect model. 
The nature of the sickness data allows us to estimate equation (5) with different time 
intervals.
13
                                                 
13 But recall that data from LINDA varies annually.  
 The above figures and the estimation of equation (1) relied on half year data, 
but in order to get more degrees of freedom we would like to use a more disaggregated 
level. At the same time we do not want the result to depend on this choice. Hence, data 
on different time intervals is used to estimate equation (5); yearly, half yearly, quarterly 
and monthly. The most conservative is yearly data, using variation from only 5 obser-IFAU – Insured by the partner?  15 
vations, with half yearly variation we end up with 10 observations, with quarterly 20 
observations, and with monthly 60 observations.
14
5  Results 
 
Results from estimations based on equation (5) are shown in Table 2. All models reveal 
that the sickness duration for married central government workers increased on average 
with 4 percent as a reaction to the partner’s increased replacement rate. Conditioning on 
age, whether the spouse is a wife, living in an urban area and household size does 
hardly change the estimated reform effect. That the reform effect is highly significant 
for all models and changes remarkably little when utilizing different time intervals or 
controlling for covariates imply that the estimate can be interpreted as causal.
15
The largest treatment effect is estimated with quarterly data with or without control-
ling for covariates. We choose to take a conservative route and use monthly observa-
tions for the rest of the analysis which also leaves us with most degrees of freedom.  
  
Table 2. Reform effect on log durations, with and without controlling for age, wives and 
household size 


























Observations  5  10  20  60 
*/**/*** indicates a 1/5/10 percent significance level. OLS standard errors in parentheses are used since they are 
larger than White’s heteroscedasticity robust standards errors. 
 
To investigate the dynamics of the reform effects and in order to evaluate the parallel 
trend assumption more formally than by inspection of Figure 2, we estimate half year 
treatment effects based on the following model:  
 
                                                 
14 To use a higher aggregation level is also a remedy for serial correlation, so by comparing results derived from data 
on different time intervals we can get an indication of whether it is a problem or not. Another way to correct for serial 
correlation is to use Newey-West standard errors. These are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. When applying this strategy all standard errors are found to be even smaller. 16  IFAU – Insured by the partner? 






d (Dgt·Halfh) + εigt   (6) 
 
where Halfh are half year dummy variables and δh are half year treatment effects. To ac-
count for correlated errors within group-time we apply the two-step approach as de-
scribe above. In order to have enough degrees of freedom when estimating half year ef-
fects on data at group-time levels we use month as the underlying time dimension. 
Figure 3 reveals what was earlier seen in Figure 2; the treatment and the control 
group have similar trends in average duration up to the reform date. After the reform, 
duration increases for the treatment group relative the control group. Interestingly, the 
reform is found to have had a gradually increasing effect on spousal sickness duration 
during the first year after it was implemented and it then stabilizes on a somewhat lower 
level the following two years. 
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15 The concordance of the results using different time intervals show that serial correlation is not a problem and is not 
making us draw too strong inference. IFAU – Insured by the partner?  17 
5.1  Quantifying the effect 
One way to quantify the estimated reform effect is to calculate an elasticity of spousal 
sick reporting with respect to the partner’s benefit. As mentioned above, we are not able 
to calculate the exact change in benefit for all workers in our sample, but for local gov-
ernment workers we know that the replacement rate increased from 90 to 100 percent 
from the first day of sickness.
16 In 1987, 39 percent of the workforce was employed in 
this sector. The estimated reform effect for local government workers is 4.6 percent, 
implying an elasticity of 0.4.
17
Another way to quantify the indirect effect is to relate it to the estimated effect from 
Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie (2008), who found that the total reform ef-
fect for the directly affected non-governmental workers added 924,000 new sick cases 
per year (77,000 per month). With an average length of a sick spell for non-govern-
mental workers of 6.8 days, this corresponds to almost 6.3 million new sick days. To be 
able to calculate how the spill-over effect among governmental workers adds to the pre-
viously estimated total effect we perform a back-on-the-envelope calculation. In 1987, 
the workforce was around 4 million who approximately had 8.1 million sick cases. Mar-
ried central government workers constitute 7.2 percent of the work force, i.e., 288,000 
workers. Assuming an equal incidence rate across sectors, central government workers 
therefore had 583,000 sick cases. The indirect increase in spousal sick duration due to 
the reform estimated in this paper was 4.2 percent which corresponds to 0.25 more days 
per sick case (5.82·(1.042-1)). With no effect on the incidence, the 583,000 sick cases 
reported in 1987 should add almost 146,000 new sick days as an indirect effect to the 
reform per year. The estimated indirect spill-over effect therefore adds more than 2 per-
cent to the total effect of 6.3 million new sick days estimated by Pettersson-Lidbom and 
Skogman Thoursie (2008). 
 Since no effect were found for the incidence this is to be 
interpreted as the total elasticity of spousal sick reporting with respect to the partner’s 
benefit. In comparison to estimated labor supply elasticities for other social insurance 
programs this is non-negligible. 
                                                 
16 For this sub-sample we have full compensation after the reform which implies that the income effect is either zero 
or positive. 18  IFAU – Insured by the partner? 
Another question is how large fraction of the previously estimated total effect is due to a 
spill-over effect among couples? If we are willing to assume that indirect effects are 
equally large and common among couples where both partners were directly affected as 
among couples where only one partner where directly affected, spill-over effects bet-
ween couples will amount to as much as 18 percent of total reform effect. This figure is 
based on the following calculation; 2 million of the work force were married and di-
rectly affected by the reform (84 percent work in the non-governmental sector and 60 
percent were married). If those 288,000 indirectly affected workers generated 146,000 
more sick days as a reaction to the reform, then those 2 million workers directly affected 
should have generated more than 1 million indirect days 
((2,000,000/288,000)·146,000). Thus, indirect effects are around 1,000,000 plus 
146,000 days of a total of 6,300,000 plus 146,000 days. In this perspective, indirect ef-
fects are non-negligible. 
5.2  Possible mechanisms 
As discussed earlier, the indirect effect can be an outcome of three different sources; an 
insurance effect, an income effect and a joint leisure effect. In this section we will pro-
vide additional analyses and explanations to be able to learn more about the relative im-
portance of these effects. The focus will be on the treatment group consisting of spouses 
to local government workers as we know the exact change in replacement rate for this 
group and for which the income effect is weakly positive as the replacement rate 
changed from 90 to 100 percent. In addition, this group experienced no change regard-
ing the day of notice, thereby lowering any income effect. 
In general, disentangling work disincentives effects, for example the existence of an 
insurance effect is very difficult. For instance, it is not possible to eliminate a potential 
income effect by controlling for the partner’s income in the regression model. The pro-
blem being that the income for an absent partner is affected by the reform, so including 
it in the regression model will create a selection bias for which the sign is ambiguous 
and most likely non-monotonic over the income distribution. Nevertheless, assuming 
                                                                                                                                               
17 For workers above the income cap the change in replacement rate is smaller. This group is less than 5 percent of 
the sample and the estimated reform effect is basically unchanged when they are excluded. IFAU – Insured by the partner?  19 
the bias to be negligible, the effect (applying the two step approach with covariates) is 
found to be 2.7 percent and highly significant when we exclude the income effect. This 
should be compared with an effect of 4.2 percent when not including the partner’s in-
come. The decrease in magnitude is consistent with a non-negative income effect which 
we know is the case for local government workers. The assumption of a negligible se-
lection bias can be relaxed if our main concern is to analyze if an insurance effect is of 
importance or not. For that purpose, the assumption we need to make is that the selec-
tion bias is weakly negative, so the estimate of 2.7 percent is too small. Moreover, the 
joint leisure effect is likely to be of less importance as more than 90 percent of all spells 
did not overlap with the partner’s spell, and by ignoring spells that did, the reform effect 
is unchanged and highly significant (this holds with and without controlling for covari-
ates). 
Another question is if there are differential effects depending on the partner’s income 
level. Since spousal labor supply is one way for families to self-insure against adverse 
economic shocks, the need for this insurance might not be the same for high and low in-
come families. For low income families, the change in the partner’s TDI benefit level 
might play a more important role for the total family income than what is the case for 
high income families. As such, effects of changes in the partner’s TDI benefit level wo-
uld be more important among low income families. To investigate this we divide the 
sample into two sub-samples: central government workers having partners with yearly 
incomes above and below the median, respectively. This procedure is equivalent and 
relies on the same assumptions as when the partner’s income is included in the regres-
sion model. The results support the idea that spouses of low income partners reacted 
more to the reform than those to high income partners (6.7 percent versus 3.9 percent). 
This pattern is sustained when applying the two-step approach. 
So, what have we learnt from these exercises? The results should be interpreted with 
caution as they are likely to be biased, but we believe that they still contain some valua-
ble information. First, results indicate that sickness insurance for a partner is to some 
extent influencing the spouse’s sickness behaviour through an insurance effect. Second, 
the income change for partners induced by the reform appear to have affected spousal 
behaviour and we find support for that low income families reacted more on the reform 20  IFAU – Insured by the partner? 
relative high income families. Third, the estimated effect is not driven by couples’ using 
the TDI system to spend more time together.  
6  Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate whether the partner’s social insurance coverage affects 
spousal labor supply. Exploiting a reform in sickness insurance system in 1987 that in-
creased the benefits for workers in the non-government sector, we compare the change 
in sick-reporting for married central government workers based on whether their partner 
received an increased coverage or not. The results show that a higher replacement rate 
for the partner did not affect the spouse’s probability to start a new sick spell, but pro-
longed ongoing spells with on average 4 percent. Using a sub-sample where the size of 
the change in the partners’ replacement rate is known, the spousal elasticity of sick days 
with respect to the partner’s benefit is estimated to 0.4. Back-on-the-envelope calcula-
tions suggest that the estimated spill-over effect in this paper adds another 2 percent to 
the previously estimated reform effect.  Moreover, part of the previously estimated 
reform effect might also include indirect effects. Our calculations suggest that 18 per-
cent of the total reform effect is such spill-over effects. 
Various theoretical explanations as to why the partner’s insurance coverage affects 
spousal labor supply are discussed. An increase in the partner’s benefit level reduces the 
costs of future unexpected events such as increased sickness absence by the partner. 
This is a so called insurance effect and might exist regardless of whether the partner re-
acts to the reform or not. The partner’s benefit level might also affect household income 
and change spousal sick reporting through an income effect. Other explanations are re-
lated to couples having a demand for joint leisure. To empirically disentangle these ty-
pes of work disincentives effects is difficult. Based on a heroic assumption we take ac-
count of the income effect by controlling for the partner’s income and find that the insu-
rance effect is present and influences spousal labor supply. Moreover, for the sample of 
couples who have no overlapping sick cases – which is the vast majority – the estimated 
reform effect is of the same size as the total reform effect, suggesting that the joint lei-
sure hypothesis is of less importance. From these analyses we tentatively conclude that 
at least a part of the estimated spill-over effect consists of an insurance effect.  IFAU – Insured by the partner?  21 
If one is not willing to rely on the assumptions made to separate out an insurance effect, 
we still conclude that spouses’ pool their labour supply since they react to each others’ 
insurance coverage. A more general conclusion is that if policy evaluations fail to take 
indirect effects into account they will notoriously underestimate the total effect of the 
reforms. 22  IFAU – Insured by the partner? 
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